Abstract
Introduction
Boards of directors perform the dual function of monitoring the firm's management and advising it on key decisions. In light of recent corporate governance failures, commentators have questioned the effectiveness of boards in performing these tasks-in particular, the monitoring task. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , among others, have highlighted the potential problem of CEOs having significant influence over their board's composition. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was designed in part to strengthen the monitoring function of the board possibly at the expense of the advisory role. In this paper we develop a model to study the link among the optimal board composition (holding the board size constant), the associated information environment, the assignment of decisionmaking authority, and the information transmission process inside a firm.
We consider a firm that faces an investment decision. The CEO of the firm has private information about the optimal investment choice but is an empire builder. Our model permits two types of board members: monitoring and advisory types. The primary task of the former is to monitor the CEO, whereas that of the advisory types is to discover decision-relevant information incremental to that privately held by the CEO. The information collectively available to the players, thus, is endogenously determined by the board composition: the greater is the fraction of advisory types on the board, the more likely it is that "new" information about the optimal decision will be discovered, but the less likely it is that the board learns the private information of the CEO (as there will be fewer monitors on the board). If the board learns the CEO's information, then the CEO cannot bias the investment decision, even if the decision is formally delegated to him-i.e., the board will then assume real authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997) .
Consistent with earlier models that have treated the information environ-ment as exogenous (e.g., Dessein 2002 , Harris and Raviv 2005 , Adams and Ferreira 2007 , the board in our setting is more willing to delegate decision-making power, the less biased is the CEO.
1 This holds regardless of the board composition. Exploiting the endogenous nature of information in our model, we show that centralized firms tends to emphasize monitoring less than firms that delegate decisions to the CEO; conversely, boards become more willing to delegate, the more monitor-heavy they are. Under centralization the board can perfectly adjust the investment decision to its own information, whereas under delegation there is an information loss in the process of noisy cheap-talk communication-
hence the board's information is more valuable under centralization. A more monitor-heavy board is less likely to discover such information, which lowers the opportunity cost associated with delegation.
In reality, of course, firms will choose board structure and the allocation of decision rights jointly. In that case, we establish a non-monotonic relationship between CEO bias and board composition. For small biases, as those increase, firms will stick to delegation, but will add monitors to the board. As the CEO's bias increases further, the firm will eventually centralize investment decisions.
This in turn increases the value of board-generated information, which results in a drop in the fraction of monitoring types on the board. As CEO bias increases even further, the firm will again add more monitoring types to the board, because a highly biased CEO will submit very noisy signals about his information to the board. Thus, the board has greater incentive to uncover the CEO's information directly via monitoring. Hence, the relationship between agency problems and monitoring intensity of boards may be locally decreasing in the data, if researchers fail to control for the allocation of decision rights within firms.
An often voiced concern is that CEOs, who can influence the board composition, nominate few monitoring types to the board in order to have an agreeable board. One key aspect of the SOX act of 2002 was an attempt to enhance the monitoring role of boards. Ironically, our results suggest that for SOX to increase shareholder value, CEO bias has to be small. Only then does the conventional wisdom prevail that the CEO prefers fewer monitors on the board than the shareholders. In contrast, more biased CEOs may have incentives to nominate more monitors to the board than the shareholders would, because a monitorheavy board is more likely to delegate. In other words, the CEO prefers to be in control of the decision (even if under greater scrutiny) over having the decision centralized by an "activist" board that may acquire valuable information of its own. SOX therefore may have exacerbated the distortions relative to the shareholder value-maximizing board composition.
2
Short of choosing the board, CEOs have more subtle means of entrenching themselves and securing real authority within the firm, e.g., by choosing investment projects that confer them an information advantage. 3 We refer to such projects as "complex" ones. To prevent such entrenchment, shareholders will be better off-under certain conditions, strictly so-if they can commit to a board composed of mostly advisory types before the CEO can determine the project complexity. Given the stickiness of boards, this constitutes a credible commitment to centralize the investment decision at a later stage. Still, even if the CEO's "noising up" of investment projects can be avoided in equilibrium, the specter of such off-equilibrium behavior may well create additional costs to shareholders.
Related literature.
The view of the dual role of boards as advisors and monitors dates back to Mace (1971) . The main dichotomy regarding board member types studied in the recent literature, however, has been that of insiders versus outsiders (e.g., Raheja 2005 , Adams and Ferreira 2007 , Harris and Raviv 2008 , Linck et al. 2008 ). Yet, Linck et al. (2009) have brought the dual role (a la Mace) back to the fore by documenting a significant shift between pre-and post-SOX boards towards more monitoring types (see also Becht et al. 2008 ). Jensen (1993) has observed that insiders make for bad monitors, which suggests equating insiders with monitors, and outsiders with advisors.
4
However, this mapping is far from robust. For instance, outsiders may be former entrepreneurs (more likely to be advisors), or bankers, former regulators/public sector officials or CPAs (more likely to be monitors). Hence, caution is in order when linking our results to empirical findings along the insiders/outsiders dichotomy. A paper that directly speaks to our framework is Baker and Gompers (2003) who have shown that venture capitalist representation results in a more powerful board and thereby in more centralization. Since VCs typically tend to perform advisory roles more than other board members, this result is in line with our model predictions.
In a dynamic model, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) have shown that CEO 4 This approach is taken in numerous empirical studies. For instance, Coles et al. (2008) hypothesize, and ultimately find, that firms with greater reliance on R&D (and hence more advisory needs) will nominate more insiders on the board. Bathala and Rao (1995) and Lehn et al. (2004) show that growth options are positively associated with the percentage of insiders on the board; growth options are viewed as a proxy for a firm's demand for advice. More generally, Lehn et al. (2004) show that over the life cycle of firms boards become more outsiderheavy, which is consistent with the view that mature firms are plagued by more severe agency problems. On the other hand, Bhagat and Black (1999) have argued that outside directors may be particularly valuable as a source of advice, rather than monitoring, for high-growth firms.
power may arise endogenously as a result of delivered performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) have demonstrated how mangers can entrench themselves by choosing complex strategies or products. We will take the ability of the CEO to nominate the board (or entrench himself) as given in some parts of our analysis.
Technically, our paper is most closely related to Dessein (2002) , Raviv (2005, 2008) , and Adams and Ferreira (2007) . All of these studies employ
cheap-talk models to analyze the strategic information transmission between the board (supervisor) and the CEO (agent). Our paper adds to this stream of literature by investigating the monitoring role of the board in terms of attempting to uncover the CEO's information-the information the parties are endowed with is therefore endogenous. In Adams and Ferreira (2007) board monitoring is phrased in terms of wrestling control away from the CEO, and an independent board has lower disutility from doing so than a dependent board. Harris and Raviv (2008) model the board's acquisition of "new" information (incremental to the CEO's information), but they do not consider board monitoring.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model setup. Section 3 looks at special cases of the model where either the allocation of decision rights or the board composition is exogenously specified. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium outcome if shareholders choose both these design variables endogenously. In Section 5 we consider the case where a powerful CEO can determine the board composition himself. In Section 6 we allow for the CEO to choose the complexity of the project as a way to entrench himself. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Model
We model the strategic interaction between a privately informed CEO of a firm and its board of directors. We take the board size as given and focus on the interaction between board composition and the allocation of decision-making authority.
5 To capture the dual role of boards, we let x ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of board members that are engaged in monitoring (the "monitoring" types) and
1 − x that of board members engaged in generating ideas (the "advisory" types).
The firm faces an investment decision, denoted by y ∈ Ê. In line with earlier studies by Raviv (2005, 2008) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) , both the CEO and the board aim to adjust the investment decision to some state of the world, θ. The board aims to maximize shareholder value (i.e., the NPV), which equals (ignoring lump sum terms):
The CEO on the other hand is biased towards larger investments, possibly due to empire benefits, 6 i.e., the CEO aims to maximize
We assume that the state variable is the sum of two signals, each indepen-
The CEO observes a for sure, whereas the board may observe a and p. We assume that it is common knowledge whether the board is informed about p.
The probability of the board learning these information parameters depends on 5 Several empirical studies have shown negative correlation between board size and firm performance beyond a certain board size, among which see Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) . 6 We do not explicitly model compensation schemes as means to align the CEO's incentives with that of the shareholders. In practice, the higher the pay-performance sensitivity in the compensation plan, the lower one would expect the bias b to be. the board composition. In particular, for given fraction of monitoring types, x, the board observes a with probability q a (x) and p with probability q p (x). The higher is x, the higher is q a (x) (better monitoring) but the lower is q p (x) (less incremental information gathering). That is, engaging in more monitoring comes at an opportunity cost of hampered board creativity, and vice versa. Specifically:
Throughout the paper we assume that A ≥ P , i.e., the CEO's private information is weakly "more important" to the investment decision than is the information that may or may not be discovered by the board. Moreover, we assume that the decision-making authority is allocated before the parties observe their respective information.
7 This seems descriptive given the fact that the choice between delegation and centralization often entails certain communication (and other) infrastructure and that firms tend to be reluctant to redesign this infrastructure on an ongoing basis. 8 However, we do allow below for the board to "veto" the CEO's investment choice under delegation if the board has learned a and the CEO chooses an investment level that is inconsistent with this information. Clearly, in this case of common information, the CEO would not be able to indulge in his bias.
Payoffs for Given Allocation of Decision Rights
If decision-making is centralized, it is the board that chooses y so as to maximize its objective specified in (1), given its available information. Denote the board's 7 Thus, our model is in broadly line with the "ex-ante environment" in Harris and Raviv (2005) , with the modification that the board will veto an investment choice made by the CEO that is inconsistent with any commonly known information.
8 For example, centralized decision making is likely to require more frequent and longer board meetings (e.g., meetings with investment bankers, lawyers, outside consultants) compared with decentralized decision making where much of this effort is taken by the CEO and his direct reports. Also, allowing for an ex-post "re"-assignment of authority will delay decision making.
information set by Ω B and the resulting investment by y B (Ω B ). Recall that the board learns a with probability q a (x) and p with probability q p (x). Therefore, 
We denote by σ 2 p the prior variance of p, and by σ 2 a the posterior variance of a conditional on receiving a cheap-talk message r a sent by the CEO, in case the board has not learned a. The board's (and hence the shareholders') expected utility under centralization then equals
where V ar C denotes the residual variance (post-cheap talk) under centralization.
Consider now the case of delegation. As we have argued above, if the board learns a, the CEO cannot indulge in his bias but instead has to choose the investment level which is optimal for the shareholders. 9 That amounts to effectively replicating the first two cases in (3). If the board does not learn a, on the other hand, the CEO has real decision-making authority and chooses y so as to 9 That is, in case a becomes common knowledge, the board can veto the CEO's decision, e.g., by way of an implicit (off-equilibrium) threat of dismissal. maximize his objective in (2) given his available information set, Ω CEO : 
where V ar D gives the residual variance under delegation. Delegation imposes an additional cost on the shareholders: with probability (1 − q a ) the board's monitoring is unsuccessful; the CEO then retains effective control over the investment decision and biases it in line with his preferences. Now consider the CEO's payoff under the respective regimes. Notice that, all else equal, the CEO, too, aims to minimize the residual variance. At the same time, he has a preference for being in control:
As one would expect, if the board prefers to delegate, then a fortiori so does the
10 It is easy to show that π C , π 
Communication Equilibrium
In this subsection, we investigate the communication equilibria and characterize the posterior variance terms σ 2 a and σ 2 p . Since there is no explicit cost of misreporting, the communication between CEO and board is of the form of "cheap talk." The sender remits a (possibly noisy) signal to a receiver, who then updates his belief according to Bayes' rule and makes the investment decision. As shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982) , all equilibria of this communication game are characterized by a partitioning of the signal space, where the sender only specifies to which partition the true realized state of nature belongs. In line with the standard cheap talk literature, we select the most informative equilibrium, corresponding to the finest feasible partitioning, as our focal equilibrium because it Pareto dominates all other equilibria.
11
We compute the equilibrium using the Crawford and Sobel (1982) approach.
Under centralization, if the board does not observe a, it will form its beliefs about a based on the report r a sent by CEO. The posterior variance is then given by
where N(A, b) is the maximum number of the equilibrium partitions under centralization (see "Preliminaries" in the Appendix). The posterior variance σ 2 p under delegation is computed analogously.
12
11 The most informative equilibrium is also supported by the NITS ("No Incentive to Separate") refinement proposed by Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) . Note however, as pointed out in Melumad and Shibano (1991) , the most informative equilibrium may not be the Paretodominant one when the sender's bias depends on his private information.
12 It is readily verified that both σ 
Board Composition and Allocation of Decision Rights
In this section we investigate the optimal allocation of decision rights for given board composition, and the optimal board composition for given allocation of decision rights. We later integrate the insights from this preliminary analysis and solve for the optimal endogenous choice for both design variables.
Exogenous Board Composition
We begin by studying the effect of the given board composition, x, on the allocation of decision rights. Define Δ(x, b) as the profit differential between delegation and centralization holding x fixed:
captures the differential costs between the two structures: under centralization the shareholders incur the information loss due to the noisy reporting of a by the CEO; under delegation they incur the bias cost and the information loss due to the noisy communication of p (with probability q p ).
14 Then:
Lemma 1 
Exogenous Allocation of Decision Rights
We now analyze the optimal board composition for given allocation of decision rights. Specifically, we aim to compare
The optimal interior solutions (if they exist) are determined, respectively, by the following first-order conditions:
where
For some of the following results it will be useful to invoke the following specific exponential form for the probability functions of learning a or p, respectively:
z , where η ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 2 holds with η sufficiently large. Then, if A =
P , the optimal board composition weighs monitoring more heavily under delegation than under centralization:
Starting out with the optimal board composition under centralization, the shareholders would always prefer more weight on monitoring when switching to delegation. The reason for this is that the opportunity cost of raising x is lower under delegation. As x goes up, the board is less likely to discover p, and as argued above, the value for the shareholders of knowing p is lower under delegation. Therefore, the monitoring role of boards is deemphasized in firms characterized by centralized boards, and vice versa.
The primary benefit of board monitoring is to mitigate the inefficiencies arising from biased decision-making (under delegation) or noisy reporting (under centralization) by the CEO. As a result, one would expect the optimal monitoring intensity to go up as b increases. The next result confirms this intuition irrespective of the allocation of decision rights.
Lemma 3 Holding constant the allocation of decision rights
This result follows directly from the fact that π S , S = C, D, has increasing differences in x and b, because both posterior variances σ 2 a and σ 2 p are nondecreasing in b. The more biased is the CEO, the more important it is for the board to learn a, regardless of the allocation of decision rights. Conversely, if b is small, there is little value to monitoring; instead the board should devote its resources to generating more information about p (i.e., x is small).
Equilibrium Choice of Board Composition and Decision Rights
We now consider the board's simultaneous choice of x and S as a function of the economic environment of the firm. Specifically, we allow for the bias parameter, b, to vary, while keeping the uncertainty parameters (A, P ) fixed. Earlier literature has linked the optimal allocation of decision rights to the magnitude of the CEO's bias (Dessein 2002, Harris and Raviv 2005) . We aim to generalize these findings to our setting with endogenously chosen boards, as characterized in Lemma 3.
The sequence of events is as follows:
Cheap-talk game, investment chosen In this base scenario, the shareholders choose both S and x. Since S is a discrete choice variable, the shareholders' problem can be decomposed as follows.
First, for any allocation of decision rights, S, find the optimal board composition,
and S = D otherwise. For notational convenience we introduce the indicator
The shareholders' optimization problem at Date 2 can be stated as follows: 
Our first main result characterizes the solution to the shareholders' optimization problem P 0 .
Proposition 1 (Timeline I) (i) For sufficiently small levels of CEO bias, b, the shareholders choose dele-
(ii) For b sufficiently large, the shareholders choose centralization, i.e., S * (b) = C, and
(iii) There exists at least one cutoffb at which the optimal allocation of decision rights switches from delegation to centralization.
The fraction of monitoring types on the board, x * (b), is increasing in b almost
everywhere, except at such cutoffs,b, where
Consistent with earlier studies, the more biased is the CEO, the more decisionmaking authority will be retained by the board. The last part of the proposition is more surprising as it shows that x * is non-monotonic in b. Starting from small levels of b, the firm optimally delegates decision-making authority to the CEO and it weighs heavily idea generation on the part of the board (low x). As b increases, by Lemma 3, x D will increase also. At some point, the CEO bias is sufficiently severe such that the board will switch from delegation to centralization. Under centralization, however, the value of learning p is higher than under delegation, as argued above. Thus, the discrete downward jump in x * (b) at the cutoffb where the board switches to centralization (see Figure 2 ).
17
Our result has empirical implications regarding the life cycle of firms. As firms mature, agency problems (as measured by b) tend to increase, hence one would expect to see more centralization at the board level and more monitorheavy boards (e.g., Lehn et al. 2004 ). However, if tests do not control for the allocation of decision rights, this general trend may be obscured in the data due to a missing correlated variable problem. Specifically, between two firms operating in similar informational environments, but differing in their severity of agency problems, the one with the less severe CEO bias (say, b <b) may have more monitors on the board than the other firm that has CEO bias of b >b.
The reason is that the former firm will delegate decisions to the CEO, whereas the latter will choose centralization.
17 As suggested by Proposition 1, there may be more than one such thresholdb at which the optimal allocation of decision rights changes. This is due to the fact that π
may intersect more than once, see also Harris and Raviv (2005) . To abstract from such technicalities and focus on the main economic tensions, we will henceforth only consider scenarios where such a threshold is unique. The threshold can be shown to be unique for plausible restrictions on the primitives of the model.
CEO Power: Influence Over Board Composition
Critics of corporate governance practice have argued that one reason why boards exert insufficient control over management is that CEOs have significant say over the board selection process. This issue was analyzed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) . In their model the CEO's bargaining power over board composition evolves dynamically as a result of delivered performance. To address the issue of CEO power-and how this affects the benchmark solution of the preceding section-we now consider an alternative timeline where the CEO chooses the board composition, x, followed by the board allocating the decision rights, S.
We will maintain the earlier assumption that the board, even if selected by the CEO, will act in the shareholders interest when choosing S. In the Concluding
Remarks section, below, we speculate on the possible effects of biased boards. The main question here is whether the CEO will choose a lower or higher percentage of monitoring types on the board compared with the level of x preferred by the shareholders. A key concern in the practitioners' literature is that a powerful CEO might prefer a less vigilant board because, holding constant the allocation of decision rights, that would make it more likely he can indulge in his bias. Specifically, under delegation the CEO can act according to his bias with probability 1 − q a (x), hence he prefers to have more advisors on the board (i.e., x to be small). The main result of this section shows that this intuition may not always hold; in fact, the CEO may sometimes prefer more monitors on the board than the shareholders.
The modified optimization program with the CEO choosing x at Date 2 reads:
Denote the solution to this program by x CEO (b). Our next result compares the CEO's choice of board composition with that selected by the shareholders in the benchmark model of Section 4. (Recall thatb denotes the threshold bias value at which a shareholder-nominated board under Timeline I is indifferent between centralizing and delegating, i.e., π
Proposition 2 (Timeline II) Suppose the CEO chooses the board composition, x, before the board allocates the decision rights, S. Then:
The key to understanding the first part of the result is to notice that by 
For small levels of CEO bias, the conventional wisdom applies in that the CEO prefers a "monitor-light" board. In that case, SOX may indeed improve shareholders value by constraining the CEO's choice. However, for greater biases, SOX, if binding, will result in a board composition that departs even further from the benchmark solution. The irony therefore is that SOX, which was intended to mitigate incentive costs arising from CEO bias and power, will increase shareholder value only if the bias is small.
There is a growing literature on the questionable welfare effects of SOX (e.g.,
Zhang 2007
). This literature has focused, for the most part, on the direct costs associated with the implementation of internal controls required by Section 404 of SOX. Our analysis complements this literature by pointing out additional opportunity costs associated with strengthening the monitoring function of boards, namely that for given board size, boards that become more focused on monitoring will become less effective advisors to the firm's management. Stepping outside the scope of our model, Corollary 1 also speaks (albeit indirectly) to the recent trend of an increase in board size post-SOX (Linck et al 2008 (Linck et al , 2009 ). Assuming firms had chosen their board composition optimally pre-SOX, then an exogenous shock that forces firms to add more monitoring types to the board, should be followed by an enlarged board as firms try to re-balance the dual functions to the new optimal monitoring/advising weights.
CEO Power: Entrenchment
A somewhat more subtle way in which CEOs can exert power and obtain de facto authority is by choosing investment projects that endow them with greater information advantage (Shleifer and Vishny 1989, Edlin and Stiglitz 1995 We first address the case where the CEO chooses A before the shareholders assemble the board and allocate the decision rights (Section 6.1), and then the case where the shareholders can preempt the CEO's choice of project complexity by committing to a certain board composition at the outset (Section 6.2).
Endogenous Project Complexity
Consider the revised sequence of events as depicted in Timeline III.
19 The possibility of CEO entrenchment via project choice is alluded to in Harris and Raviv (2005) . the equilibrium path is such that the investment will be made by the board at Date 3, then the CEO's and the board's objectives regarding project complexity are fully aligned in that both prefer the least complex project, A, at Date 2. We assume without loss of generality that, whenever the CEO is indifferent among various levels of A, he will chose the lowest one.
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For the CEO to be able to entrench himself,Â(b) ≤Ā has to hold. 21 In that case, the CEO trades the control benefits that come with delegation against the expected information loss regarding p. That is, entrenchment may be feasible for the CEO, but not necessarily optimal. To evaluate this tradeoff, we define (7) is a fortiori also the preferred choice for the CEO. Therefore:
Observation 1 (Timeline III) Suppose the CEO chooses A ∈ [A,Ā] before the shareholders/board choose S and x. Then: (i) For any b <b(A), the CEO chooses A = A, followed by the board delegating the investment decision and setting
by the board delegating the investment decision to the CEO and setting
(iii) For any b >b(Ā), the CEO chooses A = A, followed by the board centralizing the investment decision and setting x = x C (A, b).
20 This would be the unique equilibrium choice in a more general model where the CEO observes A with probability less than one.
21 Note thatÂ(b) ≤Ā is equivalent to b ≤b(Ā). For small bias levels there is no need for the CEO to entrench himself, as the board will delegate the decision anyway. For intermediate bias levels (part (ii) of the observation), it is both feasible and profitable for the CEO to entrench himself. However, for sufficiently high bias parameters (part (iii)), the board is so strongly inclined to centralize that the level of complexity required to trigger delegation exceeds the maximum complexity-CEO entrenchment then is not feasible. Instead, the CEO will choose the least complex project, A, as that will maximize his own payoff conditional on the investment decision being centralized (see Figure 6 for illustration).
We now ask if the shareholders can preempt CEO entrenchment by nominating the board strategically at the outset.
Preempting CEO Entrenchment via Board Composition
Board composition in practice is fairly sticky, in the sense that board members usually serve for long periods of time. Hence, a CEO, when considering to entrench himself by adding to project complexity, often has to take the existing board and its structure as given. Shareholders, in turn, when nominating the board at the outset, should optimally do so with an eye to the possibility of future CEO entrenchment. Therefore, we now consider the sequence of events depicted in Timeline IV where the shareholders first choose the board composition, followed by the CEO choosing the project complexity and, finally, the board deciding whether to delegate the investment decision. To ensure CEO entrenchment is a meaningful threat, we shall maintain the following assumption throughout this section:
This assumption postulates that absent CEO entrenchment the board would centralize the decision (as b ≥b (A)). At the same time, it is feasible for the
CEO to entrench himself by exacerbating the project complexity (as b ≤b(Ā) is equivalent toÂ(b) ≤Ā).
The shareholders may now be able to preempt the CEO's entrenchment action by nominating an advisor-heavy board (i.e., a low level of x) as way to commit to centralization at Date 4 in Timeline IV. Recall from Lemma 1 that the lower is x, the more likely the board will discover p, and the value of this information is higher under centralization. Denote byÃ(b, x) the level of project complexity that makes the board indifferent between centralizing and delegating for given bias and board composition, i.e.,
By the above logic,Ã(x, b) is decreasing in x-the more monitors are on the board, the more the board is willing to delegate the decision, hence a lower level of project complexity would be required for the CEO to gain control. As a consequence, by setting x below a threshold, denotedx(Ā, b), the shareholders would credibly commit the board to centralize for any level of feasible project complexity, given b.
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The shareholders' decision problem at Date 2 then boils down to a discrete profit comparison between two alternative courses of action:
(i) to preempt the CEO's entrenchment behavior by setting x <x(Ā, b) (or, equivalently,Ã(x, b) >Ā), versus
(ii) to acquiesce to the CEO's entrenchment behavior by accepting the fact that, along the equilibrium path, the investment decision will ultimately be delegated, and to adapt x optimally.
More formally, this choice can be expressed as comparing the values of the following two optimization programs:
Holding A = A fixed for now, by definition ofb(A), the board is indifferent between centralization and delegation for b =b(A), and strictly prefers centralization for any b >b(A). Thus, if both constraints (C) and (D) in the respective optimization programs were slack, the analysis would revert to the benchmark 23 In Section 3.1 we suppressed the functional dependance ofx(·) on A and P . Since we now allow for A to vary, we explicitly writex(·) as a function of A and b.
setting of Timeline I, above, so that for any b ≥b(A), as postulated by Assumption 3, the value of P C would exceed that of P D ; hence the board would prefer centralization. As a result, a necessary condition for delegation to obtain in equilibrium is that constraint (C) has to be binding. More generally, the shadow prices of the constraints (C) and (D) indicate whether there is a cost to the shareholders associated with the threat of CEO entrenchment under the respective organizational modes.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 3 holds. (i) Constraint (D) in program P
(
ii) ForĀ sufficiently small, constraint (C) in program P C is slack for any b ≥b(A). On the other hand, forĀ sufficiently large, constraint (C) is binding at b =b(A), and there exists at least one
Recall thatÃ(x, b) >Ā is equivalent to x <x (Ā, b) . Consider first the "Preempt" program P C . Suppose the CEO has limited discretion in thatĀ is close to A. From Proposition 1 we know that at the indifference bias levelb(A), On the other hand, if the CEO's discretion is sufficiently large (Ā is large), then, eventually,x(Ā,b(A)) will drop below x C (A,b(A), because the board is more willing to delegate if the CEO has significant private information. In that case, (C) is a binding constraint at b =b(A). The threat of entrenchment then is costly for the shareholders. As the CEO bias increases beyondb(A), the shareholders become less willing to delegate. More precisely, in the limit as b approachesb(Ā), we find that
where the first inequality holds because x C (·) is strictly increasing in A, and the second inequality holds by Proposition 1. That is, in case of high CEO discretion, the threat of entrenchment constitutes a binding constraint for moderate levels of CEO bias (b close tob(A)). For severe conflicts of interest (b close tob(Ā)), however, constraint (C) will be slack, i.e., CEO entrenchment does not impose additional costs on the shareholders. Suppose the CEO has significant discretion in adding to project complexity.
Then, to commit to centralization (if feasible), the board would have to deviate from x C (·). When the board only has a marginal preference for centralization over delegation absent CEO entrenchment-i.e., for CEO bias slightly abovê b(A)-it is not worthwhile for the board to deviate from x C (·) and bear the shadow price of constraint (C). Instead, the board is better off acquiescing to the CEO's entrenchment threat, and therefore will set x = x D (b).
However, as the CEO's bias increases beyondb(A), then in the benchmark setting of Timeline I (without any threat of CEO entrenchment, i.e., A = A), the shareholders would strictly prefer centralization. As the bias approaches b C , the shadow price of constraint (C) under centralization becomes small. Hence, the shareholders prefer to preempt CEO entrenchment by deviating from x C (·).
By distorting the board composition in favor of adding more advisory types, the shareholders effectively commit to centralization. While this causes an additional it might jeopardize the shareholders' ability to commit to centralized decisionmaking by nominating an advisor-heavy board.
Concluding Remarks
Shareholder activists, regulators, and the professional and academic literatures have been increasingly interested in, and at times concerned about, CEO power.
Our paper examines two aspects of CEO power. The first is the power to appoint members to the board of directors. In that case, we show, somewhat surprisingly, that the CEO may find it desirable to appoint a more monitor-heavy board as compared with that the shareholders would have chosen. The second aspect is CEO entrenchment by way of strategically exacerbating project complexity. In this case we show that when shareholders appoint the board, they sometimes choose a more advisor-heavy board as compared with the board they would have chosen in the absence of entrenchment.
Throughout the paper we assumed that board members internalize shareholders' preferences. In reality, board members' preferences might diverge from those of shareholders, or even differ amongst themselves. An interesting extension would be to incorporate divergent preferences into our model. Similar to an argument in Dessein (2002) Our model assumes that a board member can be either an advisor or a monitor. Often, however, board members could perform-with different levels of expertise-either role, so the type choice boils down to prioritizing time spent between these activities. Even then, some members are likely to be better at monitoring (e.g., compliance and accounting experts) while others are better at advising (e.g., industry experts). We speculate that our qualitative findings will continue to hold in those cases.
Other possible model extensions include allowing for the probability of successful monitoring by the board to depend on the complexity of the project. Another possible extension would be to consider CEO compensation. That might mitigate the associated bias cost and align better the objectives of the CEO and the board, but in general no compensation arrangement (short of effectively "selling" the firm to the CEO) could fully avoid the agency cost of CEO bias.
The extent to which these extensions affect our results is yet to be explored.
as stated in (8), where . Hence,
) > 0 since A ≥ P and q p (x) < 1. Applying similar arguments as in Dessein (2002) , it follows that when b tends to 0, delegation converges to first-best faster than centralization. So when b is sufficiently small, delegation dominates centralization for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Now consider the case of high CEO biases. 
The denominator is negative. For the numerator, when
24 As in the main text we shall suppress the functional dependence of key functions on A and P , if there is no risk of confusion.
Then, the numerator of dx/d(b
2 ) almost everywhere (ignoring values of b at which N(·) changes value) equals
Using (13), we have
Hence,x(b) is increasing almost everywhere. 
Given Assumption 2, when b > 0, we get interior solutions for both regimes.
The optimal interior solutions x C (b) and x D (b), respectively, are obtained by setting (14) and (15) each equal to zero. Therefore,
, and therefore
Given Assumption 2,
Next, we show that 
Then, by the global concavity of π
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof provides the solution to the shareholders's optimization program P 0 .
Part (i).
For b sufficiently small, Lemma 1 shows that π
. The first inequality is by revealed preference and the second inequality follows from π
Hence, for b sufficiently small, the shareholders chooses delegation.
Part (ii).
The proof just reverses the chain of arguments in part (i).
Part (iii).
Defineb by π
We now show that
We proceed in two steps: we first show that this chain of inequalities holds in weak form, and then rule out equality. First, suppose that
Yet, by definition ofb,
Now, we show that the preceding chain of inequalities holds in a strict sense.
Suppose that
Then, by virtue of x S (b) ∈ arg max x π S (x, b), the following must hold:
Using the proof of Lemma 2, the preceding condition implies that
Using a simple geometrical argument
Hence, at the cutoffb where the optimal organization structure switches from 
In a second step, compare π 
The first inequality follows by revealed preference and the second inequality follows fromx(b) ≥ x D (b) together with Lemma 1. However, by the definition ofb and the fact that we only allow a uniqueb (footnote 17),
can also be established by revealed preference, because the first term is the optimum of a constrained optimization problem, while the latter is the optimum of the corresponding unconstrained problem. Therefore 
Proofs of Lemma 4
Part (i). Using the definitions ofÂ(·) andÃ(·) in the main text, we have: 
Part (ii).
Recall from the main text thatÃ(x, b) >Ā is equivalent to x <x (Ā, b) . To prove that forĀ sufficiently small, constraint (C) in program 
Hence for b = b C − ε, the constraint (C) is still binding, yet the shareholders are better off choosing x =x(Ā, b) to preempt CEO entrenchment. In response, the CEO will choose A = A. 
Part (iii). [Preempt at no cost]

